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ABSTRACT: This paper advances a cognitive account of the rhetorical effectiveness of fallacious 
arguments and takes the example of source-related fallacies. Drawing on cognitive psychology and 
evolutionary linguistics, we claim that a fallacy enforces accessibility and epistemic cognitive 
constraints on argument processing targeted at preventing the addressee from spotting its 
fallaciousness, by managing to prevent or circumvent critical reactions. We address the evolutionary 
bases of biases and the way that these are exploited in fallacious argumentation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Much of the research concerned with fallacies has been typological in nature, 
attempting to delineate particular kinds of fallacies. Among the fallacies identified 
are those which relate to the reliability of third party sources, either by making 
appeal to those sources (ad populum and ad verecundiam) or attempting to discredit 
them (ad hominem). This research has been focused on specifying the characteristics 
of these arguments, including, for example, what it is that makes them fallacious 
(Walton, 2006; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). This paper will approach these 
fallacies – referred to hereafter as source-related fallacies – within an explanatory 
framework in which rhetorical effectiveness is seen as a product of cognitive 
constraints and biases (see Hart, 2011, in press.; Oswald, 2011, forth.). We will 
therefore not be concerned with descriptive and definitional issues. Rather, we aim 
to illuminate how and why illegitimate invocations of third parties may succeed in 
convincing the audience of a given conclusion. 
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This framework draws on insights from cognitive science, in particular 
cognitive pragmatics (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2012) and 
evolutionary approaches to communication (Sperber et al., 2010). We will argue 
that there are cognitive principles pertaining to the use and processing of source-
related fallacies which account for their rhetorical effect. These principles take the 
form of cognitive heuristics (see Gigerenzer, 2008) which guide inferential 
processes at the level of evaluation.1 Specifically, we are suggesting that source-
related fallacies exploit our processing mechanisms, which are usually reliable and 
accurate, but which are by their necessarily fast and frugal nature inherently fallible. 
In section 2 we introduce the three fallacies we are concerned with. Section 3 
presents an evolutionary approach to argumentation which suggests that ad 
populum and ad verecundiam arguments meet the demands of hearers’ systems for 
epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010) by presenting sources mistakenly deemed 
reliable whilst ad hominem alerts epistemic vigilance to characteristics of the 
targeted source which misguidedly betray their unreliability. In section 4 we 
elaborate an account of fallacy processing in terms of cognitive constraints and 
biases. Here, we focus on the information-selection mechanisms at play in argument 
processing. We suggest that these fallacies work, as a consequence of evolved 
cognitive biases (see e.g. Pohl, 2004) and relevance considerations in processing, by 
constraining the information sets available to the hearer, resulting in a hindrance to 
critical evaluation. Section 5 illustrates our claims with an analysis of each argument 
as found in political discourse. 
 
2. SOURCE-RELATED FALLACIES 
 
Source-related fallacies may be identified as those whose premises predicate 
something about the sources of information used in the course of the argument. 
These can be divided into arguments which, in order to support the speaker’s 
conclusion, resort to sources of information in the form of authorities and majorities 
(ad verecundiam and ad populum respectively) and those which attack them (ad 
hominem). Following Walton (2006), the fallaciousness of these arguments can be 
captured in their failure to satisfactorily answer critical questions associated with 
underlying argument schemes. 
 Ad verecundiam, for example, can be broadly construed as a problematic 
appeal to expert opinion. Of course, not all appeals to expert opinion are fallacious. 
What determines the fallaciousness of an appeal to expert opinion, according to 
Walton, is whether it satisfactorily answers a set of critical questions associated 
with an underlying argumentation scheme. The argumentation scheme behind 
appeals to expert opinion can be presented as below (Walton, 2006, p. 87): 
 
Argumentation scheme for appeal to expert opinion 
Major premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain D containing Proposition A. 
Minor premise: E asserts that proposition A (in domain D) is true (false). 
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).” 
                                                        
1 See Oswald (2011, forth.) on constraints operating at the level of comprehension. 
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The critical questions that determine whether or not a particular 
instantiation of the scheme is fallacious are formulated as follows (Walton, 2006, p. 
88): 
 
Expertise Question. How credible is E as an expert source? 
Field Question. Is E an expert in the field that A is in? 
Opinion Question. What did E assert that implies A? 
Trustworthiness Question. Is E personally reliable as a source? 
Consistency Question. Is A consistent with what other experts assert? 
Backup Evidence Question. Is E’s assertion based on evidence? 
 
Ad verecundiam is the fallacious variant of the argument scheme which arises 
when any one of these questions receives a negative answer. Walton formulates 
similar schemes and associated critical questions to assess the fallaciousness of 
appeals to popular opinion and attacks of the source of a given proposition. For 
reasons of space, we do not present these here but refer the reader directly to 
Walton (2006). However, we note that ad populum and ad hominem, like ad 
verecundiam, are the fallacious variants of respective underlying argument schemes. 
One critical question which crops up in all three argument schemes concerns 
the reliability and/or credibility of the source of information that is invoked. In all 
three, what is at stake is not the content of the argument but, rather, something 
external to it. In the case of ad verecundiam, the strength of the argument lays in the 
perceived trustworthiness of the source. The strength of ad populum arguments lays 
not in the faith one has in a particular source but in the weight carried by 
widespread belief. Ad hominem similarly operates on the parameter of authority but 
in the reverse direction where it dismisses a given proposition on the grounds that it 
is asserted by a source whose legitimacy is cast into doubt. 
In the next section, we will argue that the critical abilities underlying 
Walton’s critical questions are encapsulated in the evolved, cognitive competences 
of communicators. These competences may take the form of what Sperber et al. 
(2010) refer to as epistemic vigilance. Source-related fallacies, we will suggest, work 
by manipulating epistemic vigilance where they can be characterised as “failed 
diagnostic strategies” (Jackson, 1996, p. 111) reinterpreted in cognitive and 
adaptationist terms. 
 
3. EPISTEMIC VIGILANCE 
 
On an evolutionary account of communication, language must have evolved initially 
for purposes of cooperation (Sperber, 2001; Hurford, 2007). However, any such 
system of cooperation is susceptible to exploitation in the form of deception (Origgi 
& Sperber, 2000). For communication to stabilise within the species, therefore, “all 
cost-effective available modes of defence are likely to have evolved” (Sperber, 2000, 
p. 135). For Sperber et al. (2010, p. 359) these defences amount to “a suite of 
cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance”. Epistemic vigilance, according to 
Sperber et al., is both content-directed and source-directed. In content-directed 
vigilance, hearers attend to the logical consistency of the message as well as its 
plausibility given background assumptions. In source-directed vigilance, hearers 
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assess the trustworthiness of speakers, defined as judgements of competence, 
benevolence, expertise, reliability, credibility, etc. 
In the practice of argumentation – a communicative practice by which 
speakers provide information in support of claims in order to convince others – 
hearers exercise epistemic vigilance in order to avoid being misled. The functioning 
mechanism here is an argumentative module which operates both in the production 
and evaluation of arguments. In the evaluation of arguments, the mechanism is 
responsible for identifying reasons to (dis)believe the conclusion of an argument 
(Mercier & Sperber, 2009, 2011). The module, here, takes as input claims and 
combines them with contextual information to yield an intuitive representation 
concerning the relationship between the premises and the conclusion contained 
within the argument. This then allows the hearer to make a judgement on the 
argument’s acceptability. In the production of arguments, the argumentative module 
allows speakers to formulate arguments in ways which are intended to satisfy or 
otherwise exploit the hearer’s epistemic vigilance. 
In so far as we are interested in the rhetorical effectiveness of fallacies, we 
are interested here in the evaluative dimension of the argumentative module. 
Moreover, because we are concerned with source-related fallacies in particular, we 
will deal only with source-directed vigilance. 
Epistemic vigilance amounts to a diagnostic strategy selected for in the 
evolution of communication. However, by virtue of the resource-bound nature of 
our cognitive architecture, it remains fallible (see section 4). It is precisely this 
imperfection, we suggest, that fallacies exploit. Ad verecundiam and ad populum 
appear to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy epistemic vigilance by presenting the 
conclusion as entertained by external sources the hearer is expected to trust. In ad 
verecundiam, it is the expertise, authority, competence, credibility and benevolence 
etc. of the source that lends epistemic strength to the conclusion. In ad populum, the 
epistemic strength lays, in part, in the sense of likelihood derived from learning that 
a large number of people take the conclusion to be true. Ad hominem, by contrast, 
directs hearers to the epistemic weakness of the conclusion advanced by the 
targeted source by making explicit their untrustworthiness. Ad hominem itself 
therefore satisfies epistemic vigilance directed at the speaker (the utterer of the ad 
hominem) but alerts epistemic vigilance directed toward the targeted source. 
The three fallacies, then, may overcome epistemic vigilance by providing 
apparently satisfactory evidence; the first two rely on perceived trustworthiness 
whilst the latter directs epistemic vigilance towards ‘mistakenly’ assessing the 
unreliability of the source as a sufficient reason to reject the conclusion they 
advance. When the fallacies are successful, then, it means that the cognitive system 
has not found it relevant to question the evidence provided within the argument. In 
other words, the system has failed to mobilise additional (critical) information 
which should alert the hearer to the argument’s fallaciousness. To account for why 
hearers fail to recognise these arguments as fallacious, we turn to particular 
cognitive constraints and biases involved in argument processing. 
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4. PROCESSING CONSTRAINTS AND BIASES 
 
One major constraint on argument processing consists in information selection 
(Oswald, 2011, forth.; Maillat & Oswald, 2009, 2011). In this section we suggest that 
information selection may be influenced by evolved cognitive biases and 
considerations of relevance such that the importance of critical questioning is 
downplayed. As a general theory of human cognition, applied to communication, 
and to the extent that it formulates precise criteria of information selection, 
Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) allows a handle on argumentative phenomena of 
the kind we are concerned with here. 
 
4.1 Relevance Theory 
 
RT is a model of ostensive-inferential communication which postulates that the 
cognitive mechanisms involved in comprehension are regulated according to 
relevance, defined as an optimal balance between cognitive costs and benefits. 
Understanding a speaker’s utterance amounts to identifying the interpretation that 
best satisfies the ratio between the cognitive efforts incurred in processing the 
utterance (including the selection of contextual information required to make sense 
of it) and the cognitive effects that can be anticipated. Cognitive effects are defined 
in terms of an assumption’s usefulness to the cognitive system (i.e., its ability to 
provide reliable new information and to revise, discard or strengthen previously 
held information). In interpretation, hearers follow a path of least effort in 
calculating cognitive effects and cease further processing as soon as expectations of 
relevance are met. 
This technical definition of relevance highlights two crucial parameters 
according to which information is selected. These are captured by the extent 
conditions of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 125): 
 
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its 
contextual effects in this context are large. 
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the 
effort required to process it in this context is small. 
 
Relevance, thus, is a function of accessibility, since that which is accessible is 
less effortful to process. At the same time, it is a function of epistemic strength, 
where adding, revising or discarding assumptions is, of course, an epistemic matter. 
Two important points emerge for our purposes: (i) relevance assessments are 
heuristic in nature and therefore susceptible to error; (ii) the extent conditions of 
relevance may extend beyond the comprehension procedure to provide parameters 
for information selection in argument evaluation. 
In relation to the second point above, we suggest that fallacies work precisely 
by prohibiting hearers from selecting critical information which would point to their 
fallacious nature. This argument is founded on the principle that information 
processing involves competition between information sets. As Sperber and Wilson 
put it, “not all chunks of information are equally accessible at any given time” (1995, 
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p. 138). Certain information is selected, according to its relevance in a particular 
context, at the expense of other information which, by the procedure, is inverse-
proportionately less relevant and therefore not attended to. In what follows, we 
argue that this selection effect is, at least in part, a function of evolved cognitive 
biases. 
 
4.2 Cognitive biases 
 
Cognitive biases are errors in judgement, thinking and memory which can be 
predicted to arise from heuristics in information processing (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Pohl, 2004; Gigerenzer, 2008). Heuristics are decision-making strategies 
which are generally useful and have evolved to cope with uncertainty, resource 
limitations and time pressures, etc. However, by their ‘fast and frugal’ nature, they 
can sometimes lead to “severe and systematic errors” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 
p. 1124). 
Certain cognitive biases bring about errors specifically in epistemic 
judgements. For example, a conformity bias can be shown to result in something like 
a ‘group effect’ (Henrich & Boyd, 1998). Such heuristics and biases may be rooted in 
the evolution of social cooperation. For example, as Sperber et al. (2010, p. 380) 
state: 
 
If an idea is generally accepted by the people you interact with, isn’t this a good 
reason to accept it too? It may be a modest and prudent policy to go along with the 
people one interacts with, and to accept the ideas they accept. Anything else may 
compromise one’s cultural competence and social acceptability. 
 
The claim we are making in this paper is that cognitive biases of this kind, in 
conjunction with relevance considerations in information processing, may explain 
the effectiveness of certain fallacies, including source-related fallacies. 
Cognitive biases are triggered by fallacies and in turn provide additional 
input to the argumentative module. Given what is at stake, biases have evolved to 
make this input highly relevant to the argumentative module. As a result, in 
evaluating the argument the argumentative module may deem it unnecessary to 
engage in further cognitive processing, including asking critical questions. The 
argument satisfies expectations of relevance and, by consequence, epistemic 
vigilance too; it therefore goes through the system unchallenged. 
On this account, fallacies are directly related to cognitive biases which make 
some information relevant and other, critical information irrelevant. Ad populum 
operates on the back of a conformity bias.2 We can make a similar case for ad 
verecundiam. For example, the famous Milgram experiments (1974) observed an 
‘obedience effect’ which is presumably, at least partly, the product of an authority 
bias. Ad verecundiam is able to activate precisely this bias. It usually pays to go along 
with majorities because to do so is efficient and because not to do so compromises 
                                                        
2 Maillat (in press) has suggested that ad populum also hinges on the bias behind the validity effect 
(Hackett Renner, 2004) where repetition can be seen to contribute to acceptance of information. 
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one’s social inclusion. It may pay to go along with authorities for similar reasons. 
Moreover, experts possess information in particular domains which hearers might 
not otherwise have access to and which, by virtue of their expertise, is usually 
reliable. It is therefore perfectly rational to take the word of an expert. Fallacies, in 
sum then, work in convincing audiences because they exploit the inherent fallibility 
of heuristics which are, in the normal course of events, helpful. 
Biases related to conformity and expertise make what majorities and 
authorities say or think epistemically strong to the degree that hearers are less 
likely to subject the argument to full critical evaluation. Ad hominem can be analysed 
as operating on the same mechanisms, though it may be considered the flipside of 
ad verecundiam. Whilst ad verecundiam tries to establish the source’s 
trustworthiness, ad hominem tries to undermine their trustworthiness. And since 
the risks of communication are so great, any suggestion that the source is not 
credible is relevant enough for the system that the hearer does not properly 
consider the content of the argument or critically question the significance of the 
source’s credibility in relation to the quality of the argument. 
In the final section, we see how all of this plays out in particular illustrative 
analyses. 
 
5. ILLUSTRATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Ad verecundiam3 
 
In 2004, prior to a national vote about the possibility for 2nd and 3rd generation 
immigrants to benefit from simplified naturalisation procedures, the Swiss far‐right 
political party UDC4 published a campaign ad in several newspapers entitled 
“Thanks to automatic naturalisation, the Muslims soon to be in majority?” (“Grâce 
aux naturalisations automatiques, les Musulmans bientôt en majorité?”).5 The 
document contains three graphs with statistics and a text explaining to the reader 
that simplifying these naturalisation procedures will result in a dramatic increase of 
Muslims in the country, which is something they implicitly present as an 
undesirable threat to the Swiss identity. In explicit terms, they merely refer to this 
as “a problem”. Interestingly, the text mentions the testimony of an expert, Sami 
Aldeeb, who works for the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law at the University of 
Lausanne. Here is the text: 
 
(1) “Sami Aldeeb, who is responsible for Arabic and Muslim law at the 
Swiss Institute of Comparative Law in Lausanne, has an even more 
drastic vision of the situation: ‘The proportion of Muslims in 
                                                        
3 The example discussed in this subsection is taken from Burger et al. (2006), who perform a Speech 
act-theoretic analysis of the corpus. We reinterpret here some of their findings within our 
framework. This article also contains a reproduction of the campaign ad. 
4 UDC stands for “Union Démocratique du Centre”, i.e. ‘Democratic Union of the Centre’. 
5 The ad can be seen in the appendix of the online version of Burger et al. (2006) at the following 
address: http://mots.revues.org/609 (last accessed, 25.06.2013) 
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Switzerland triples every ten years. Today, 310’000 Muslims legally 
reside in the country and some 150’000 others illegally reside in 
Switzerland. In twenty years, they will be in majority. There will be 
more Muslims than Christians in Switzerland by then’. And that is 
where the problem lies, because ‘Muslims place their religion above 
our laws.’”6 
 
The argument contained in this excerpt is quite complex but minimally offers 
the premise in (2) as a main reason to defend the conclusion in (3): 
 
(2) Explicit premise: Muslims place their religion above our laws. 
(3) Conclusion: It is a problem that in twenty years Muslims will 
outnumber Christians in Switzerland. 
 
The argument contained in (1) is part of a more global pragmatic 
argumentation developed throughout the text which enjoins readers to vote against 
facilitated naturalisations in order to avoid the undesirability (in the opinion of the 
authors) of a majority of Muslims. We are specifically interested here in (i) the 
perceived authoritative character of the expert that is called in and (ii) the way the 
argument links the premises to its conclusion. 
Sami Aldeeb is presented as an expert in comparative law, which indeed he 
was at that time. His testimony on Muslim law should thus at first sight be 
(reasonably) perceived as relevant and trustworthy. As a consequence, the contents 
expressed between quotation marks are likely to be perceived as epistemically 
strong. What the reader doesn’t know is that his words are actually quoted from a 
prior interview he gave to the Swiss tabloid Blick, the publication of which Aldeeb 
had not approved himself, because instead of reflecting his actual point, which 
consisted in the defence of an integrationist model, his words were used for their 
potential islamophobic connotations (Burger et al., 2006, p. 17). We note that unless 
the reader personally knows Aldeeb, they have no way of knowing this and they 
therefore have no cause to address the critical questions associated with the 
relevant argument scheme. In other words, epistemic vigilance is satisfied. This is 
problematic, however, because the reader has been prevented from critically 
assessing the expert’s testimony on the issue. 
A second problem with the use of the expert source in this argument, as 
noted by Burger et al. (ibid.), lays in the tentative inferences the reader is likely to 
draw from the Arabic resonance of the name Sami Aldeeb. In the absence of further 
evidence, the reader might infer from his name that the expert is himself Muslim, 
which would therefore tend to represent him as someone who does not hold hostile 
                                                        
6 Original text: “Sami Aldeeb, responsable du droit arabe et musulman à l’Institut suisse de droit 
comparé à Lausanne, a une vision encore plus drastique de la situation: ‘La proportion de Musulmans en 
Suisse triple tous les dix ans. Aujourd’hui, 310'000 Musulmans vivent légalement et quelque 150'000 
autres vivent illégalement en Suisse. Dans vingt ans, ils seront la majorité. Il y aura alors plus de 
Musulmans que de Chrétiens en Suisse’. Et c’est bien là que réside le problème, car ‘Les Musulmans 
placent leur religion au-dessus de nos lois.’” 
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preconceptions about Muslims, i.e., as a speaker who is unbiased towards Muslims. 
Under this interpretation, his words, which negatively represent Muslims, cannot be 
taken to be motivated by an inherent dislike for Muslims. This, in turn, positively 
affects the objective quality of the expert and increases his perceived 
trustworthiness. Nowhere in the document is the reader discouraged from drawing 
this inference, which is actually false; Sami Aldeeb is in fact a Christian Palestinian. 
Again, this piece of information would be highly relevant for the reader to establish 
source credibility. Its absence only increases the chances of the false inference being 
drawn and as a consequence boosts the epistemic status of whatever the ‘unbiased’ 
expert has to say. 
A third problem with this argument can be identified in the problematic 
endorsement of the argumentative link presented in (1). A close look at the text 
shows that Sami Aldeeb only provides contents which are then used in the premises 
of the argument (the propositions given in quotation marks). The semantic content 
of the conclusion, but also the argumentative connective ‘because’, are however 
outside quotation marks. We hypothesise that inattentive readers might overlook 
this and take Aldeeb to be responsible for the argument being made for the 
following three reasons. Firstly, his testimony is framed as a “drastic vision of the 
situation”. Drastic and dramatic visions of a situation are likely to foreground 
problematic issues. Secondly, the negative connotations of the statements he is 
responsible for appear in bold characters, making them more salient than both the 
conclusion and the connective. Thirdly, assuming the reader’s epistemic vigilance 
filters are satisfied of Aldeeb’s trustworthiness in the way described above, the 
credibility of his words and their islamophobic connotations is compatible with the 
interpretation that they constitute a serious problem. 
(1) is a particularly interesting illustration of the ad verecundiam fallacy. The 
features of the text highlight the trustworthiness of the source in a way that should 
meet the demands of epistemic vigilance. 
 
5.2 Ad populum 
 
In 2005, Michael Howard, former leader of the British Conservative Party, delivered 
a speech on immigration in Telford in which he argued for a restrictive policy on 
immigration and specifically on the asylum system. The main standpoint of his 
discourse is found in the following excerpt:7 
 
(4) “It’s not racist to talk about immigration. It’s not racist to criticise the 
system. It’s not racist to want to limit the numbers” 
 
In order to support these claims, he verbalises the voice of the majority in the 
following ways: 
 
                                                        
7 The complete transcript can be found here (last accessed 08.03.2013): 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4430453.stm 
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(5) “The majority of British people (...) are united on this issue.” 
(6) “Everyone wants new people to settle as long as numbers are limited.” 
(7) “Talk to people and whatever their background, religion or the colour 
of their skin – they ask the same thing: ‘Why can't we get a grip on 
immigration?’ These are the people who are always ready to welcome 
genuine refugees to Britain, or families who want to work hard and 
make a positive contribution to our country.” 
(8) “But I’ve lost count of the times that British people of ethnic 
backgrounds have told me that firm but fair immigration controls are 
essential for good relations.” 
 
The implicit overall argumentation produced by Howard in this speech is an 
appeal to popular opinion which can be minimally reconstructed in the following 
way: 
 
(9) Everyone, like us, says there is a problem with immigration: this 
cannot be racism, since it is unlikely that all of the people denoted by 
‘everyone’ are wrong and racist. 
 
We take this argumentation to be an instance of the ad populum fallacy for 
two reasons. First, it fails to satisfactorily answer the critical questions associated 
with the scheme for arguments from popular opinion (in particular, we do not have 
conclusive evidence that the large majority invoked by Howard actually endorses 
what he says). Second, the way popular opinion is portrayed by Howard 
systematically and repeatedly presents “everyone” as morally respectable. However, 
the grounds for this appraisal are ill-evidenced. Nevertheless, the moral qualities of 
the majority referred to confer epistemic strength on the arguments in the following 
ways. 
The third party invoked in support of Howard’s conclusions is a majority 
depicted as: (i) morally virtuous, i.e., hard-working and welcoming (7); and (ii) non-
racist and unbiased towards foreigners, because they are themselves of different 
ethnic backgrounds and origins (7, 8). We have seen previously (see section 4) that 
the voice of majorities carries epistemic weight, to the extent that it is perfectly 
rational to consider that a large amount of people united on a given issue are 
unlikely to be wrong. Depicting a majority as morally virtuous further adds to the 
perceived trustworthiness of the source. This in turn ensures that the assumptions 
reported to be endorsed by the majority are highly salient in the hearer’s cognitive 
environment as he processes Howard’s speech.8 
The cognitive bias responsible for the validity effect (see Hackett Renner, 
2004, Maillat, in press.) can here be seen to operate too: Howard repeats on several 
occasions in this discourse the idea that the majority of British people agree with 
him, and this could also be seen as a way of increasing the epistemic value of the 
majority’s opinion on the subject. Additionally, since repetition makes for salience 
                                                        
8 The cognitive environment is defined as the set of assumptions that are manifest to an individual at 
any given time (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). 
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and accessibility, the fact that Howard’s (and the majority’s) opinion is repeated 
across the speech makes it more accessible than alternative information sets. From 
the perspective of cognitive processing, this means that it stands a better chance of 
being represented than alternative, less salient, information sets, which could 
contain critical information pertaining to the argument. 
Finally, as mentioned above in section 4.2, the conformity bias is exploited in 
Howard’s words in his positive characterisation of the majority whose opinion he 
reports. The social consequences of disagreeing with a morally good, unbiased and 
non-racist majority are potentially disastrous for an individual. In the Telford 
speech, Howard’s depiction of the majority he summons in support of his claim 
could very well be seen as a way of constraining any potential critical reaction on 
behalf of the audience. 
 
5.3 Ad hominem 
 
During Prime Minister’s Questions on October 18 2011, Russell Brown, Labour MP, 
asked David Cameron, Britain’s current Prime Minister, if he could provide a list of 
people affected by the Adam Werritty scandal.9 To this, Cameron replied with the 
following:10 
 
(10) “It comes slightly ill from a party to lecture us on lobbying when we 
now know the former defence secretary is working for a helicopter 
company, the former home secretary is working for a security firm, 
Lord Mandelson, well he’s at Lazards, and even the former leader, the 
former prime minister, in the last few months he’s got £120,000 for 
speeches to Credit Suisse, Visa and Citibank. He told us he’d put the 
money into the banks, we didn’t know he’d get it out so quickly.” 
 
Russell’s question required the PM to provide information about some 
lobbying practices his party had been accused of. Instead, the PM evades the attack 
by highlighting the opposition’s own dubious practices, and therefore their non-
legitimacy in filing attacks on the issue. Cameron, then, has used the tu quoque 
variant of the ad hominem fallacy. This argument is fallacious because “the hypocrisy 
of the arguer is not necessarily evidence of the falsity of what she argues” (see Aikin 
2008, p. 156). 
By pointing to the hypocrisy of his attacker, Cameron is attempting to 
undermine their credibility. This is quite common in political discourse (and 
                                                        
9 Adam Werritty is a business investor who was a close friend to Liam Fox, the then Secretary of State 
for Defence. Werritty allegedly accompanied Fox on overseas engagements acting as an informal 
adviser. Werritty was able to use his position to provide access to the minister. This conflict of 
interest prompted a series of investigations which eventually lead to Fox’s resignation in October 
2011. 
10 See the transcript of the argument here (last accessed 08.03.2013): 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/political-news/cameron-attacks-brown-on-
speeches.15458313 
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political debates in particular). However, (10) is remarkable for a specific reason. 
Not only does Cameron provide evidence of dubious practices of the opposition, he 
provides a significantly higher number of such practices in order to outweigh 
Russell’s attack. In the situation where epistemic vigilance is required to assess the 
trustworthiness of third parties which are being charged with inconsistency or 
hypocrisy, one could reasonably assume that the most trusted source would be the 
one to suffer the least damage. By identifying numerous members of the opposition 
and the dubious practices they are accused of, Cameron overwhelmingly outcharges 
his opponent. (10) further sets the stage for a generalising inference to be drawn 
where hearers might extend the negative traits of some members of the opposition 
to the whole party. 
Cognitively speaking, then, (10) foregrounds information meant to destroy 
the opponent’s legitimacy. The tu quoque attack is particularly strong here from an 
epistemic perspective because it presents different instances of the same 
wrongdoing, whilst the original attack it addresses only questions the extent to 
which the Werritty scandal has damaged the ruling party. For reasons of relevance 
related to the possibility and usefulness of identifying concrete instances of the 
problem, this may prevent the audience from mobilising critical information. They 
might, accordingly, be left with no grounds to critically question the argument 
produced by Cameron. This, in turn, would result in the argument not being 
challenged and is precisely what makes the fallacy effective. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
According to Hamblin, the standard treatment of fallacies is to suggest that a 
“fallacious argument … is one that seems to be valid but is not so (Hamblin, 1970, 
p.12, original emphasis). This, he argues, does not allow for the elaboration of a 
consistent theory of fallacies. However, we take his statement to highlight a crucial 
feature of fallacies which precisely explains their effectiveness: hearers fall for 
fallacies because they do not spot them. This can be accounted for by examining the 
evolved, cognitive constraints involved in information processing. 
The heuristics and biases programme and RT together provide an 
explanatory framework for interpreting the rhetorical effectiveness of fallacies 
which we characterise in terms of the consequences they have for epistemic 
vigilance. We have considered the case of source-related fallacies and argued that 
these implement constraints on the information sets that will eventually be deemed 
relevant as hearers process the argument. These constraints explain that critical 
questions, which we see as embodied in epistemic vigilance, are neither asked nor 
answered. 
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